This paper contributes to the small but growing body of literature which tries to explain why, despite the predictions of some theoretical studies, empirical support for the pollution haven hypothesis remains limited. We break from the previous literature, which tends to concentrate on US trade patterns, and focus on Japan. In common with Ederington et al.'s (2005) US study, we show that pollution haven effects are stronger and more discernible when trade occurs with developing countries, in industries with the greatest environmental costs and when the geographical immobility of an industry is accounted for. We also go one step further and show that our findings relate not only to environmental regulations but also to industrial regulations more generally.
Introduction
The potential link between the stringency of environmental regulations and international trade and investment patterns has been discussed by politicians, academics and the media for over two
decades, yet such issues remain high on the international policy agenda. The recent US proposal to impose carbon tariffs on imports of carbon-intensive goods such as steel, cement, paper and glass from countries that have not taken steps to reduce their own emissions provides a case in point. India has already expressed its strong opposition to such plans, while the WTO is concerned that there may be a profusion of unilateral climate-related trade restrictions of this nature, particularly given the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen negotiations to achieve an international climate change agreement. The conventional wisdom amongst policy makers therefore suggests a clear link between regulation costs and trade flows, a position often supported by the predictions of many theoretical studies (e.g. McGuire 1982 , Baumol and Oates 1988 , Chichilnisky 1994 ). However, a sizeable empirical literature has failed to find compelling evidence to support the hypothesis that pollution intensive industries in developed economies will migrate to less regulated economies (e.g. Kalt 1988 , Tobey 1990 , Grossman and Krueger 1993 and Cole and Elliott 2003a .
More recent studies have therefore focused on the reasons why industries in highly regulated economies do not systematically relocate in this manner. Antweiler et al. (2001) argued that trade in pollution intensive industries may be subject to both pollution haven and traditional factor endowment pressures. More specifically, since pollution intensive industries are typically the most capital intensive, these different pressures may actually compete against each other and hence tend to cancel out (Antweiler et al. 2001 , Cole and Elliott 2003b and Cole and Elliott 2005 .
In addition, Ederington and Minier (2003) and Levinson and Taylor (2008) raise the possibility that environmental regulations may act as secondary trade barriers i.e. a means of protecting domestic industry. If this is the case, then the stringency of regulations may be a function of trade as well as trade being a function of regulations. When treated as an endogenous variable, both Levinson and Taylor (2008) and Ederington and Minier (2003) find that US environmental regulations do influence US trade patterns. Ederington et al. (2005) suggest that there may be three reasons for the lack of evidence in support of the pollution haven hypothesis. Firstly, since most trade occurs between developed economies which have similar levels of regulatory stringency, an analysis of aggregate trade flows is unlikely to detect the impact of regulations on patterns of trade between high and low income economies. Second, for most industries environmental costs form a very small proportion of total costs. As such, the pressure to physically relocate may be relatively minor for many industries. However, there are a small subset of industries for whom such costs may be more considerable and who may therefore be subject to pollution haven pressures. Finally, Ederington et al. (2005) argue that some industries are more footloose than others. Those that experience high transport costs, high plant fixed costs or benefit from agglomeration economies may tend to be less geographically mobile.
Thus, by mixing industries that are both relatively immobile and relatively footloose, previous analyses may have failed to detect pollution haven pressures amongst the footloose industries.
Using US industry-level data for the period 1978-92, Ederington et al. find some evidence to support each of these three points.
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In a theoretical study, Zeng and Zhao (2009) focus on one aspect of industry immobility -the existence of agglomeration economies -and illustrate how such economies can negate pollution haven pressures, particularly if differences in regulatory stringency between 'North' and 'South' are relatively small. Finally, Wagner and Timmins (2009) illustrate the importance of agglomeration economies to German FDI flows from pollution intensive industries and show that pollution haven effects are detectable when such agglomeration economies are controlled for.
The previous literature therefore suggests that regulations may influence certain firms' relocation patterns in a manner consistent with the pollution haven hypothesis but many previous studies were failing to detect this by not targeting the most relevant industries or trade with the most relevant economies. However, to date, the only compelling evidence for this assertion, in the context of trade flows, is provided by Ederington et al. (2005) for US industries. What remains unknown therefore is whether this finding is specific to the US, particularly given its close trade links and common border with Mexico, or whether it would be common to all major industrial economies. Secondly, the dataset used by Ederington et al. ends in 1992 and hence we are unclear whether such findings may be specific to the period under consideration, primarily the 1980s, or whether such pressures are detectable more recently.
The aim of the present paper is therefore to focus on a major industrial economy other than the US, namely Japan, and to assess whether pollution haven pressures on trade flows are detectable if we focus on the more appropriate trading partners and more appropriate industries in the manner suggested by Ederington et al. In addition to examining the stringency of environmental regulations, we go beyond the analysis of Ederington et al. by also considering a measure of general industrial regulations. This allows us to assess whether Japanese trade flows are influenced by industrial and labour regulations alongside environmental regulations.
Japan represents an ideal country for a study of this type. The data we analyse are for the years 1989-2003. This was a period of significant change in both trade and the regulatory framework in Japan. From the early 1990s Japan entered a period of relative economic stagnation following the bursting of the asset bubble. This was a period when Japan had to undertake structural reforms and take measures to revitalise domestic industry as well as dealing with deflation and non-performing loans.
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Until the 1980s, the Japanese economy grew by producing domestically competitive products and discovering new markets abroad. The appreciation of the Yen in the mid-1980s forced many firms to shift production to East Asia. These production networks are now an important part of the Japanese economy.
Even though the 1990s were a period of stagnation, Japan continued to experience a steady increase in imports and exports and managed to maintain a surplus throughout this period. While the Japanese economy has historically been highly regulated, a process of deregulation began in the late 1990s in an attempt to increase Japanese competitiveness. This process is ongoing although Japan would still appear to be a highly regulated economy particularly in areas roles of the Environment Agency, taking environmental policy into the heart of government decision making. The culmination of these various policies is that Japan "…established one of the cleanest environments earlier than most OECD countries (Sumikura (1998 pp. 255 ) and demonstrated that a good environmental reputation is not only good for the environment but is also a valuable economic and cultural asset.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology and the results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Methodology
In common with the previous literature on trade and the pollution haven hypothesis, we test the impact of regulations on trade patterns using industry-level data for the manufacturing sector.
Specifically, we begin by estimating, using fixed effects, the determinants of industry-level net 
where M it denotes net imports in industry i and year t, defined as imports minus exports divided by industry value added.
3 KL denotes the capital-labour ratio, defined as physical capital stock per worker; T represents tariffs, measured as tariff revenues as a share of imports in each industry; α i is an industry specific intercept and λ t is a year specific dummy. 
Where i refers to a two-digit industry, t refers to year, VA refers to value added and Rj denotes a regulated three-digit industry. The regulations considered within the INDREG measure cover all aspects of activity, and relate to finance, labour, trade and health and safety, for example. Also included are environmental regulations implying a degree of overlap between our two regulation measures. Unfortunately, we are not able to remove the environmental regulations from
INDREG.
Appendix Table A3 whether such effects are discernible if take into account the fact that some firms are more footloose than others and (iii) whether pollution haven effects can be detected within industries with larger regulation costs. In addition, for each of these hypotheses we test the effect of environmental regulations and general regulations on trade separately.
To test point (i) we estimate separately the determinants of industry-level total net imports from the world as a whole; net imports from the developing world; and net imports from China 5 . We would expect the impact of regulations on net imports to be greater in terms of magnitude, and perhaps statistical significance, for net imports with the developing world and China. Regarding point (ii) we wish to examine whether certain industries are less responsive to environmental regulations, and industrial regulations in general, because they are inherently less mobile. Similarly, we might expect more footloose industries to show greater sensitivity to changes in regulation costs. We capture an industry's mobility in two ways. First we use a measure of average transport costs within an industry which we denote as TRANS. The argument here is that industries with large transport costs cannot locate far from their customers and hence will be less inclined to relocate in the face of regulation costs. Using HS 9 digit data on Japanese exports we calculate the unit value of each sector (value to weight ratio), defined as 1000 Yen of output per Kg. We then calculate the average unit value within each of our 41
industries. For ease of interpretation we take the reciprocal of the unit value to obtain a measure of immobility in the form of a weight to value ratio (Kg per 1000 Yen of value). We expect regulation costs to have a smaller effect on net imports in industries with large transport costs.
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The second measure of immobility captures agglomeration economies within an industry and is denoted as AGGLOM. If an industry is benefiting from such economies it will be reluctant to relocate to avoid regulations unless the benefits of relocation (in terms of regulation costs avoided) exceed the lost agglomeration economies. In short, we would expect regulation costs to have a smaller impact on net imports in industries with larger agglomeration economies. To measure agglomeration economies we used a Gini index capturing the distribution of firms by overseas regulations. Nevertheless, we expect the impact of Japanese regulations to be greater on net imports from China and the developing world since anecdotal evidence suggests that Japanese regulations are more stringent than those in China and the developing world.
across 47 prefectures for each industry. The greater the Gini index the greater the unevenness (or inequality) of the distribution and hence the greater the agglomeration of firms.
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To assess the extent to which an industry's immobility influences the impact of regulations on trade, we interact our measures of regulations with our measures of immobility and include them in equation (1). We predict the coefficient on such interactions will be negative and statistically significant, implying that the overall effect of regulations on net imports is lower the greater the degree of immobility.
Finally, regarding point (iii) above, we wish to examine whether regulation costs have little overall impact on net imports because they tend to form only a small proportion of total costs in the majority of industries. We test this in two ways. First, we interact our two regulation measures with the average level of regulation within the industry over our sample period (i.e. we interact ENVREG with average ENVREG and we interact INDREG with average INDREG).
A positive, statistically significant, coefficient on such an interaction would indicate that an increase in regulation costs has a greater impact on net imports the higher the average level of regulation costs. Second, we create a dummy variable for the 5 industries with the greatest level of INDREG and ENVREG. We then interact these dummy variables with the appropriate regulation measure (INDREG and ENVREG) . These interaction variables therefore allow us to test whether the level of regulations in the most highly regulated industries has an impact on net imports over and above the impact of regulations across all industries. 8 Appendix A4 provides the 10 most immobile (i.e. least footloose) industries according to our measure of agglomeration economies (AGGLOM) and transport costs (TRANS). Agglomeration effects in Japan could be offset if new industry "agglomerations" develop in other countries. The generation of industrial clusters is increasingly being used as part of industrial policy and a means of attracting FDI to a region or country.
9 A third way of addressing this point would be to include a squared term for INDREG and ENVREG. In unreported estimations we did include such terms and results were highly consistent with those estimated using interaction terms.
Results
Tables 1-3 provide our estimation results. Table 1 reports the estimation of our basic model, as set out in equation (1), where measures of immobility are omitted. Columns 1-3 provide the results for total net imports (from the world), net imports from the non-OECD and net imports from China, respectively, using our waste costs measure of regulation costs. Columns 4-6 do the same but replace waste costs with our measure of general industrial regulations, while columns 7-9 include both measures of regulations.
[ Table 1 about here]
With regard to our regulation variables we see that the coefficients on both measures are positive and statistically significant for net imports from all three geographical groupings. To provide some insight into the magnitude of the regulation effects, Table 4 provides elasticities calculated at the means of the relevant variables for the full specification models 7 to 9. We find that a 1% increase in ENVREG would increase total net imports by 0.13%, non-OECD net imports by 0.14% and Chinese net imports by 1.28%. Comparable figures for a 1% increase in INDREG are 1.15% for total net imports, 1.41% for non-OECD net imports and 2.54% for Chinese net imports. In common with the findings of Ederington et al. (2005) , we therefore also find the magnitude of the impact of regulations to be greater in the context of trade with developing regions. However, in contrast to Ederington et al.' s US findings, we do still find Japanese regulations to have a statistically significant effect on net imports from the world as a whole.
As expected, the coefficient on the capital labour ratio is negative and generally statistically significant, particularly for net imports from the non-OECD. The coefficients on tariffs are negative for total net imports and net imports from the non-OECD but positive for net imports from China. However, in each case they are statistically insignificant.
10 Table 2 reports estimates of an extended model where we include AGGLOM, our measure of agglomeration economies intended to capture an industry's immobility. Columns 1-3 include AGGLOM, ENVREG and an interaction of the two, again for our three geographical groupings.
Columns 4-6 replace waste costs with our measure of general industrial regulations, including an interaction with AGGLOM, and columns 7-9 include both measures of regulations and both interactions.
[ Table 2 about here]
The coefficient on the capital labour ratio remains negative throughout and now displays greater statistical significance. The sign and (lack of) significance of tariffs is similar to that in Table 1 .
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Turning to AGGLOM, our measure of agglomeration economies, we see that it is generally a negative determinant of net imports and is statistically significant for China. This suggests that industries that benefit from agglomeration economies are likely to experience lower net imports from China, as we might expect. However, it is the interactions with ENVREG and INDREG that interest us most. We can see that the coefficient on AGGLOM interacted with ENVREG 10 Our tariff variable is an aggregation of all tariff revenues from all countries and does not take account of preferential tariffs or regional trade agreements. Such a measure is consistent with previous studies (for example Ederington et al. 2005) . The lack of statistical significance may reflect the relatively high level of industry aggregation in this study which may be preventing tariff revenues from having a meaningful impact on net imports. In addition, our industry fixed effects may be partly capturing the effects of tariffs due to the relative lack of temporal variance within this variable.
11 In unreported estimations we interacted tariffs with both AGGLOM and TRANS but the coefficients on these interactions were not statistically significant.
is negative in all models and statistically significant for net imports from the OECD. Similarly, the coefficient on AGGLOM interacted with INDREG is also negative but displays even greater statistical significance. These results therefore indicate that while regulations costs (however measured) increase net imports, this effect is reduced in industries that are relatively immobile.
In terms of elasticities as reported in Table 4 , we find that a 1% increase in ENVREG will increase total net imports by 0.11%, non-OECD net imports by 0.16% and Chinese net imports by Table 2 but AGGLOM has been replaced as a measure of immobility with a measure of transport costs (TRANS). On its own we can see that the coefficient on TRANS is generally negative and statistically significant in four of the nine models, notably in the models of trade with China and the non-OECD. This suggests that industries with greater transport costs are likely to experience lower net imports from China and the developing world, perhaps due to their immobility. Turning to the interactions between TRANS and our two measures of regulations, we can see that the coefficient on TRANS interacted with ENVREG is insignificant throughout and of mixed sign. However, the coefficients on TRANS interacted with INDREG are negative and consistently significant in all models.
[tTable 3 about here]
From Table 4 , a 1% increase in INDREG will increase total net imports by 0.26%, non-OECD net imports by 0.29% and Chinese net imports by 0.30% at the mean level of TRANS. As in Tables 5 and 6 provide the results from testing our third hypothesis, whether the effect of regulations on net imports is more discernible in high regulation cost industries. For reasons of space we concentrate on net imports from the non-OECD and from China. In Table 5 , columns 1-4 include our measure of ENVREG interacted with the average level of ENVREG within each industry over the sample period, with columns 1 and 2 including AGGLOM as the measure of immobility and columns 3 and 4 including TRANS as the measure of immobility.
Columns 5-8 instead include ENVREG interacted with a dummy variable equal to one for the five industries with the greatest average level of ENVREG.
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Columns 5 and 6 include AGGLOM, columns 7 and 8 include TRANS. Table 6 replicates Table 5 using INDREG instead of ENVREG. 12 We also estimate models in which we include both TRANS and AGGLOM together with their interactions with INDREG and ENVREG. The sign and significance of these variables was almost identical to those in Tables 1-3 and hence for reasons of space we do not report these results. 13 In unreported sensitivity analyses we also tested a dummy capturing the ten industries with the greatest average level of ENVREG. Results were almost identical.
[ Table 5 about here]
[ Table 6 about here]
With regard to Table 5 , we can see that the coefficient on ENVREG interacted with average ENVREG over the sample period is positive in three of the four models and significant in one of those. In the other model it is negative and statistically insignificant. The positive coefficients imply that ENVREG has a greater effect on net imports the greater the level of average ENVREG within an industry. However, the limited statistical significance reduces the strength of this finding. Turning to ENVREG interacted with a high ENVREG dummy variable in columns 5-8 we can see that the coefficient on this interaction variable is positive in all four models and statistically significant in two of these. This therefore suggests that in the 5 'dirtiest'
industries ENVREGs have an impact on net imports over and above the average impact across all industries (as captured by the coefficient on the ENVREG variable). Table 6 
Conclusions
This paper finds environmental and industrial regulations to be statistically significant determinants of Japanese net imports from the rest of the world, from the non-OECD countries and from China. We also find the magnitude of the impact of regulations on trade flows to be greatest on trade flows with the developing world.
In line with Ederington et al. (2005) , we find that the degree to which an industry is footloose can have a major influence on the extent to which regulations influence its net imports. Using agglomeration economies and transport costs to capture an industry's immobility, we find that the greater the level of immobility within an industry the smaller the effect of regulations on net imports. Finally, we find that the impact of regulations on net imports is greater the higher the average regulation costs are within the industry.
In common with Ederington et al. (2005) and Cole and Elliott (2005) this paper therefore supports the argument that while pollution haven effects may not be experienced by all 14 The Spearman correlation coefficient between ENVREG and AGGLOM is 0.083 (p-value 0.027) and between ENVREG and TRANS is 0.16 (p-value 0.000). Ederington et al. do not report such correlations for the US.
industries, such effects are greatest, and most detectable, when trade occurs between developed and developing economies and in relatively mobile industries with high regulations costs.
In terms of the policy implications of our findings, Japan has acknowledged that in order to maintain its competitive position it needs to maintain a leading presence in R&D, to build on existing agglomerations and to foster new clusters and to attract the best capital and minds from around the world. Our study suggests that an additional benefit from agglomeration is that it can 0.050 0.14 0.10 0.22 0.060 0.14 0.10 0.21 Robust t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Industry and year effects included. ENVREG*ave is ENVREG multiplied by average ENVREG within each industry over time. ENVREG*dum is ENVREG interacted with a dummy =1 for the 5 industries with the highest levels of ENVREG. 
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